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Justice Jackson and the Second Flag-Salute Case: 
Reason and Passion In Judicial Opinion Writing 
 
 
            I.     INTRODUCTION 
 In 1943, the Supreme Court handed down West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette.1 With Justice Robert H. Jackson writing for the six-Justice majority, the Court upheld 
the First Amendment right of Jehovah’s Witnesses schoolchildren to refuse to salute the flag or 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance, state-imposed obligations that the children and their parents 
contended were acts of idolatry that violated Biblical commands. Judge Richard A. Posner has 
said that Justice Jackson’s effort “may be the most eloquent majority opinion in the history of the 
Supreme Court.”2 
 Barnette reached the Court as the nation waged global war, a dire moment in history that 
Part II of this article describes. For its high drama and the endurance of its doctrine, the case 
continues to engage historians and students of the Court.3 This article concerns the singular 
                                                 
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
2 Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 147 (1990). 
3 See, e.g., David R. Manwaring, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962); 
Shawn Francis Peters, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2000); Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 443-45 (Michael 
C. Dorf ed., 2004); Irving Dilliard, The Flag-Salute Cases, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 
(John A. Garraty ed.,  1988); The Flag Salute Cases, in THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT 
SHAPED AMERICA (Kermit L. Hall & John J. Patrick eds., 2006); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise 
in Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363 (2008); Charles Alan Wright, My Favorite Opinion – The 
Second Flag-Salute Case, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1297 (1996). 
 
 
eloquence pinpointed by Judge Posner and others.4 Justice Jackson adroitly balanced two 
ingredients – reason and passion – that (as Part III describes) have marked assessments of rhetoric 
and human experience since ancient times, that guided the nation’s Founders and early Presidents, 
that have now moved President Obama in both of his memoirs, and that otherwise continue as 
dual touchstones frequently applied in law and popular culture. 
 Few cases summon the high drama that energized the Court in Barnette during wartime, 
but (as Part IV describes) focusing on reason and passion throughout the opinion writing process 
remains a useful judicial compass today. Justice Jackson’s blend of these two ingredients, and his 
mastery of the written language, bequeathed a decision whose bedrock First Amendment holding, 
according to Professor Charles Alan Wright, “teems with vivid expressions and memorable 
statements” that still enrich the fabric of the law as statements of core American values.5 
   II.   “AMONG THE DARKEST TIMES IN RECENT MEMORY”  
 Barnette’s record began in early January of 1942, barely a month after Japan attacked the 
Pacific naval fleet at Pearl Harbor. Historian David McCullough recalls these days as “[a]mong  
the darkest times in recent memory.”6 “Hitler's armies were nearly to Moscow; . . . German  
submarines were sinking our oil tankers off the coasts of Florida and New Jersey, within sight of  
the beaches, and there was not a thing we could do about it; . . . half our navy had been destroyed 
at Pearl Harbor. We had scarcely any air force. Army recruits were drilling with wooden rifles. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 448 (calling Barnette’s majority opinion “among the 
most eloquent to be found in the whole of the U.S. Reports”); The Flag-Salute Cases (Hall & Patrick), supra note 3, 
at 101 (“one of the greatest statements on civil liberties ever written”); Robert L. Tsai, supra note 3, at 365 
(discussing the “sparkling decision penned by Robert H. Jackson”). 
5 Wright, supra note 3, at 1299. 
6 David McCullough, The Course of Human Events 1 (2003 Jefferson Lecture In the Humanities), 
available at http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/mccullough/lecture.html (last visited June 25, 2010). 
 
 
And there was no guarantee whatever that the Nazi war machine could be stopped.”7 
 General James H. Doolittle’s daring raid over Tokyo and other Japanese cities would buoy 
American morale, but the raid was still a few months away (April 18). So too were the first great 
American victories, in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4-8), and at Midway Island (June 4-7).  
Without the reassurance of hindsight available to later generations who know the war’s outcome, 
Americans in mid-winter 1942 remained resolute and committed, yet aware that the nation faced 
an epic challenge to vanquish the Axis Powers in total war. 
 In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, appeals to patriotism summoning young and old 
spread quickly from coast to coast. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of 
Education followed a number of other state and local school boards by passing a resolution that 
required all public school students and teachers to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance each day.8  The West Virginia resolution allowed no exemptions because, the state  
board found, “national unity is the basis of national security.”9   
 Noncompliance carried draconian punishment. Where West Virginia schoolchildren  
refused to salute or recite in their classrooms, their parents faced imprisonment for violating 
compulsory education acts and citation for child neglect, which might cause temporary or 
permanent loss of custody.10 The children themselves faced not only expulsion from school, but 
also delinquency proceedings and confinement for “insubordination” in state reformatories, 
austere institutions notorious for locking up vulnerable dependent children in close quarters with 
murderers, rapists and other predatory and sometimes mentally ill adolescent criminals supervised 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 Peter Irons, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 16 (1988). 
9 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626. 
10 Barnette, id. at 626, 629-30; Peters, supra note 3, at 164-77.  
 
 
by physically and emotionally abusive guards. In 1950, one study condemned these institutions as 
“incompatible with human dignity, . . . a black record of human tragedy, of social and economic 
waste, of gross brutality, crass stupidity, totalitarian regimentation . . . and a corroding monotony 
even deadlier than physical violence.”11  
 The brunt of statutes and resolutions like West Virginia’s fell heavily on the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, a small religious group despised by many Americans for their sometimes aggressive 
public proselytizing, and for their refusal to serve in the military or to salute the flag or recite the 
Pledge. And for their success in court. When Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote in 1941 that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses “ought to have an endowment in view of the aid which they give in solving 
the legal problems of civil liberties,”12 he was not dispensing gratuitous praise; he was observing  
that the Witnesses had appeared regularly before the Justices to seek the law’s refuge from 
dominant majorities, and had frequently won.13  
  In 1942, legislators and school authorities in West Virginia and elsewhere stood on solid  
constitutional ground because only two years earlier, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the 
Supreme Court had firmly rejected religious freedom claims by Witnesses families and held that 
the First Amendment permitted states and localities to mandate flag salutes and recitation of the 
Pledge in the public schools.14 Less than three weeks before the Fall of France to the Nazis, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the eight-Justice Gobitis majority, and Justice Stone stood  
alone in dissent despite Frankfurter’s private entreaties for unanimity.15 “History teaches us,” 
Justice Stone read from his dissent in open Court, “that there have been but few infringements of 
                                                 
11 Albert Deutsch, OUR REJECTED CHILDREN xix, 162 (1950). 
12 Peters, supra note 3, at 186.  
13 Id. at 12-13, 183.  




personal liberty by the state which have not been justified . . . in the name of righteousness and 
the public good, and few which have not been directed . . . at politically helpless minorities” such 
as the Witnesses.16 Justice Stone rejected “the position that government may, as a supposed 
education measure and as a means of disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which 
violate their religious conscience.”17 
        Few Supreme Court decisions,” wrote one historian, “have ever provoked as violent a 
public reaction as the Gobitis opinion.”18 The decision drew immediate condemnation from more 
than 170 leading newspapers and support from only a few, but the swift reaction extended beyond 
ritten words.19 The decision also unleashed a national wave of vigilantism against the Witnesses, 
whose refusal to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag appeared disloyal or even treasonous to 
Americans who perceived these acts as domestic obligations with war clouds looming, and who 
feared domestic subversion (the so-called Fifth Column). Witnesses families suffered beatings, 
physical intimidation, and property destruction from mobs, often while local sheriffs and other 
law enforcement officials stood watching in evident approval, without intervening to secure the 
victims’ safety.20 
 “Because lawless mobs may have misunderstood [Gobitis’] meaning is not in itself a 
reason to change it,” wrote Justice Jackson’s law clerk in an undated confidential memorandum.21 
Most historians acknowledge, however, that the intensity of the post-Gobitis brutality surprised 
and likely shocked Justices who had not anticipated such a bloody backlash against the small, 
                                                                                                                                                               
15            Dilliard, supra note 3, at 294-96; The Flag Salute Cases (Hall & Patrick), supra note 3, at 97. 
16 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting); Dilliard, supra note 3, at 297-98. 
17 Id. at 602. 
18 Irons, supra note 8, at 22. 
19 Dilliard, supra note 3, at 298. 
20 Peters, supra note 3, at 8-16, 72-152.  
21 Robert L. Tsai, The Law Clerk’s Memo to Robert Jackson in Barnette (2009), available at 
 
 
peaceable religious group that had summoned their protection.22  
 In the wake of Gobitis, as many as two thousand Witnesses children were expelled from 
the nation’s public schools and many of their parents landed in criminal court.23  On October 6, 
1942, the special three-judge West Virginia federal district court hearing Barnette v. West 
Virginia State Board of Education enjoined enforcement of the board’s resolution against more 
than a half dozen expelled Witnesses children, including Walter Barnett’s two young daughters 
who attended Slip Hill Grade School outside Charleston.24  The unanimous panel decision was 
written by Fourth Circuit Judge John J. Parker, who would have been sitting on the Supreme 
Court, except that the Senate by the scant margin of two votes had refused to confirm him after 
President Herbert Hoover nominated him in 1930.25  
 The three-judge panel recognized that lower courts ordinarily apply Supreme Court 
precedents until the Court itself overrules them,26 but the panel declined to apply Gobitis, which 
the Court already appeared on the verge of rejecting. Judge Parker noted that in Jones v. City of 
Opelika (1942), another First Amendment appeal brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court had 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2009/04/law-clerks-memo-to-robert-jackson-in.html (last visited June 24, 2010). 
22 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 447-48 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses “have suffered brutal beatings; their property has been destroyed; they have been harassed at 
every turn by the resurrection and enforcement of little used ordinances and statutes”); Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 3, 
at 443-45; Peters, supra note 3, at 237-38, 251 (discussing reaction on the Supreme Court); The Flag Salute Cases 
(Hall & Patrick), supra note 3, at 97; but see Tsai, supra note 3, at 374 (“The Justices might have been horrified at the 
ferocity of the reprisals, but they would have been unbelievably naive to think that their original decision did not 
expose recalcitrant students and their parents to a series of collateral legal and extra-legal ramifications.”). 
23 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 445.  
24 Barnette v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W.Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943); David L. Hudson, Jr., Woman in Barnette Reflects on Famous Flag-Salute Case (2009), available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=22441 (last visited June 27, 2010). The Barnett and Gobitas 
families achieved different results in the Supreme Court, but they shared a common legacy: because of evident 
clerks’ errors below, the Court’s decisions misspelled their surnames.  
25 See, e.g., Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1146, 1154 (1988).  Ernesto J. Sanchez, John J. Parker and the Beginning of the Modern Confirmation Process, 32 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 22 (2007).     
26 Barnette v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W.Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943); see also, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998). 
 
 
distinguished the earlier decision and three members of the Gobitis majority (Justices Hugo L. 
Black, William O. Douglas and Frank Murphy) had called Gobitis “wrongly decided,”27 Justice 
Stone’s earlier approach in dissent.   
 “Under such circumstances and believing, as we do, that the flag salute here required is 
violative of religious liberty when required of persons holding the religious views of plaintiffs,” 
wrote Judge Parker, “we feel that we would be recreant to our duty as judges, if through a blind 
following of a decision which the Supreme Court itself has thus impaired as an authority, we 
should deny protection to rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by  
constitutional guaranties.”28 
 Gobitis dissenter Justice Stone and the two newest members of the Court (Justices Robert 
H. Jackson and Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr.) also seemed poised to join the Opelika trio and overrule 
the earlier decision. Jackson’s distaste for Gobitis was known within the Roosevelt 
Administration while he was U.S. Attorney General before his appointment to the Court in 
1941.29  When Jackson wrote The Struggle For Judicial Supremacy a few months before he joined 
the Court, he cited Gobitis as inconsistent with the Court’s usual “vigilan[ce] in stamping out 
attempts by local authorities to suppress the free dissemination of ideas, upon which the system of 
responsible democratic government rests.”30  
 On the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1942, a few months 
before Judge Parker wrote, Judge Rutledge dissented from a panel decision that upheld the 
convictions of two Jehovah’s Witnesses for selling their religious literature on a public street 
                                                 
27 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (dissenting opinion); see also Barnette v. 
West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D W.Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
28 Barnette v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D W.Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943).  
29 Robert L. Tsai, supra note 3, at 397-98.   
 
 
without securing a license or paying a tax.31 In an apparent reference to Gobitis, Rutledge 
lamented that the Witnesses “have had to choose between their consciences and public education 
for their children.”32  
 The Supreme Court periodically overrules prior decisions, but rarely one so freshly minted 
as the near-unanimous Gobitis. With the nation and the world watching, and with ultimate victory 
over the Axis by no means assured, however, Gobitis indeed fell in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, often remembered as the “second flag salute case.”  With unmistakable 
symbolism, the Court handed down the new decision on Flag Day, June 14, 1943.  
 Barnette left Justice Frankfurter was in dissent, together with Justices Owen J. Roberts 
and Stanley B. Reed, who tersely noted their adherence to Gobitis but declined to join the 
Frankfurter opinion.33 Responsibility for explaining the Court’s unusual about-face fell to Justice  
Jackson, who may have seemed an unlikely candidate for the role. Justice Stone had ascended to 
the Chief Justiceship when Charles Evans Hughes retired in 1941, and by assigning the Barnette 
opinion to himself, he could have vindicated his lonely stand in Gobitis for protecting "freedom  
of mind and spirit," an appeal to conscience that one historian says “still ranks as one of the 
Court’s finest dissents.”34 Whatever the reason for the assignment, Justice Jackson did not 
disappoint the confidence that the Chief Justice placed in him.  
         III. REASON AND PASSION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 Barely a week after announcement of Barnette, Time magazine, under the headline “Blot 
Removed,” wrote the Court had “reaffirmed its faith in the Bill of Rights – which, in 1940 [in 
                                                                                                                                                               
30 Robert H. Jackson, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 284 & n.48 (1941). 
31 Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J., 
 dissenting), vacated and remanded, 319 U.S. 579 (1942), on remand, 138 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
32 Busey, 129 F.2d at 38. 
33 Barnette, 318 U.S. at 642-43. 
 
 
Gobitis], it had come perilously close to outlawing.”35 Justice Jackson had accomplished his 
mission with a majority opinion that balanced reason and passion, two guideposts familiar to 
historians and observers of contemporary political and popular culture. 
 As complementary and sometimes antagonistic forces for assessing performance or 
behavior, reason and passion hold an imposing pedigree that now reaches to the highest levels of 
our national life. In The Audacity of Hope, Barack Obama wrote that “the Constitution envisions a 
road map by which we marry passion to reason, the ideal of individual freedom to the demands of 
community.”36 Discussing his own religious upbringing in his other memoir, Dreams From My 
Father, the future President also invoked the two forces, writing that his grandmother’s family 
“read the Bible but generally shunned the tent revival circuit, preferring a straight-backed form of  
Methodism that valued reason over passion and temperance over both.”37 
 The synergy of reason and passion dates at least from Plato (c. 470-399 B.C.), who asked 
in The Republic whether “passion [is] different from reason,” and concluded that “the one ruling 
principle of reason [is] that reason ought to rule.”38 Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) said that “[a]ll the 
acts of man are necessarily done from seven causes: chance, nature, compulsions, habit, reason, 
passion, desire.”39 “The law,” concluded Aristotle, “is reason free from passion.”40 
 The interplay between reason and passion helped shape American legal and political 
thought from the nation’s earliest years, beginning with the writings of Alexander Hamilton, 
                                                                                                                                                               
34 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting); Peters, supra note 3, at 60.  
35 Judiciary: Blot Removed, TIME, June 21, 1943, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,766726,00.html?internalid=ACA (last visited June 25, 2010). 
36 Barack Obama, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 113 
(2008). 
37 Barack Obama, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 14 (2004). 
38 Plato, THE REPUBLIC, Book IV, at 159-62 (Jowett, B. ed.).  
39 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, 1.10, at 57 (Lane Cooper ed.., 1932). 
40 Aristotle, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 146 (Ernest Baker trans., 1946).  
 
 
James Madison and John Jay in The Federalist, the essays that throughout 1787 and 1788 
advocated ratification of the federal Constitution in the thirteen new states. Federalist No. 15, for 
example, argued for replacing the weak Articles of Confederation because “the passions of men 
will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”41   
 Federalist No. 49, rejected arguments that future constitutional questions would be 
resolved best by frequent constitutional conventions: “The passions . . . not the reason, of the 
public, would sit in judgment.”42 “[I]t is the reason of the public alone that ought to controul and 
regulate the government, the essay explained. “The passions ought to be controuled and regulated 
by the government.”43 Federalist No. 50 disparaged the outcomes of earlier state experiences,  
where “passion, not reason, must have presided.”44 
 Federalist No. 55 argued for limiting the size of the House of Representatives because 
“passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason” in a multitude.45  “[T]he more numerous 
any assembly may be. . .,” Federalist No. 58 continued, “the greater is known to be the 
ascendency of passion over reason.”46 Federalist No. 63 argued that the smaller, more 
deliberative Senate would check the impulses of “the people stimulated by some irregular 
passion, . . . until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind.”47  
                                                 
41 THE FEDERALIST, The Federalist No. 15, at 91, 96 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
42 Id., The Federalist No. 49, at 338, 343 (emphasis in original). 
43Id. 
44 Id., The Federalist No. 50, at 343, 346 (emphasis in original). 
45 Id., The Federalist No. 55, at 372, 374. 
46 Id., The Federalist No. 58, at 391, 395-96. 
47 Id., The Federalist No. 63, at 422, 425. See also, e.g., id., Federalist No. 10, at 56, 58 (1787) (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing the likelihood that political factions would arise in a political democracy: “As long as 
the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as 
the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal 
influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.”); id., The 
Federalist No. 48, at 332, 333-34 (1788) (stating that the executive and legislative branches should be designed to 
counterbalance one another: “where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is . . . sufficiently 
 
 
 Long before George Washington presided over the Constitutional Convention, reason and 
passion guided his personal and public life. As a schoolboy not yet sixteen, he had fulfilled a 
school exercise by copying 110 “Rules of Civility and Decent Behaviour in Company and 
Conversation,” drawn from an English translation of a book that French Jesuits had compiled in 
the late 1500's.48 The 58th Rule taught the future President as he transcribed: “[I]n all Causes of 
Passion [ad]mit Reason to Govern.”49  
 Washington’s personal and public life so fully reflected the Rules that biographers have 
regarded their lessons as “formative influences in the development of his character.”50  In 1783, 
for example, General Washington learned that some of his officers privately planned a meeting to 
discuss grievances against Congress, which had not paid them promised salaries or pensions; his 
Newburgh Address to the officers dissuaded them from pursuing the plan, which he condemned 
as “addressed more to the feelings of passions than to the reason & judgment of the army.”51 
 Shortly after returning home from the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Washington 
wrote that “[a]ll the opposition to [the Constitution] is . . . addressed more to the passions than to 
the reason.”52 Weathering criticism in 1795 that his administration yielded too much to Britain in 
Jay’s Treaty, Washington wrote to his Attorney General Edmund Randolph that he looked 
forward to a “time when passion shall have yielded to sober reason.”53  
                                                                                                                                                               
numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the 
objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes.").  
48 GEORGE WASHINGTON’S RULES OF CIVILITY & DECENT BEHAVIOUR IN COMPANY AND 
CONVERSATION (Charles Moore ed., 1926); see also id. at x, xiv. 
49 Id. at 13 (brackets in original). 
50 Id. at ix. 
51 Quoted in David Ramsay, The Life of George Washington ch. 9, “Archiving  Early America.” 
52 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 1741-1799, George 
Washington to Charles Carter (Dec. 14, 1787), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw290261)) (last visited June 25, 2010). 
53 Id., George Washington to Edmund Randolph (letter) (July 31, 1795), available at 
 
 
 In his Farewell Address in 1796, Washington warned the nation not to “adopt[] through 
passion what reason would reject,"54 advice that he would repeat during his brief retirement at 
Mount Vernon before his death in 1799.55 
 As one of history’s great political philosophers and as an opponent of the Federalists 
before he became the nation’s third President, Thomas Jefferson likely  knew the writings of the 
ancient Greeks and surely knew the influence of the more recent Federalist essays. “Let nothing 
be spared of either reason or passion,” Jefferson wrote in 1810, “to preserve the public confidence 
entire, as the only rock of our safety.”56 During the War of 1812, he opposed suspension of U.S. 
exports as “dictated by passion, not by reason.”57 
 In one of his earliest published speeches, delivered in 1838, twenty-eight-year-old 
Abraham Lincoln spoke out against a rash of lynchings for reflecting a “growing disposition to 
substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober judgment of the Courts.”58  “Passion 
has helped us” by igniting the Revolution that won independence from Britain, the young Lincoln 
explained, but unrestrained passion “will in future be our enemy. Reason, cold, calculating, 
unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the materials for our future support and defence.”59  
                                                                                                                                                               
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw340194)) (last visited June 25, 2010). 
54 The Farewell Address of President George Washington (Sept. 17, 1796), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp (last visited June 25, 2010). 
55 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 52, George Washington to Prof. John Luzac (letter) 
(Dec. 2, 1797), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw360082)) 
(last visited June 25, 2010). 
56 Library of Congress, THE THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, Thomas Jefferson to Caesar A. Rodney, 
Feb. 10, 1810 (letter), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(tj110070)) (last visited June 25, 2010). 
57 Id., Thomas Jefferson to William Short, June 18, 1813 (letter), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(ws03051)) (last visited June 25, 2010). 
58 Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young Men's 
Lyceum of Springfield, Ill., Jan. 27, 1838, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A DOCUMENTARY PORTRAIT THROUGH HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 35-36 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1977).  
59  Id. at 43. 
 
 
 Abolitionist leader and former slave Frederick Douglass wrote more generally about racial 
justice in 1855. “There is no relation more unfavorable to the development of honorable character, 
than that sustained by the slaveholder to the slave. Reason is imprisoned here, and passions run 
wild.”60 
 In our own time, partisans in public policy debates frequently urge resort to reason, not 
passion.61 The tandem also figures in Presidential messages and, as it has since at least 1837, 
House and Senate proceedings.62 During the House Judiciary Committee’s Watergate hearings in 
1974, for example, Congress member Barbara Jordan riveted the nation with her plea that “[i]t is 
reason, and not passion, which must guide our deliberations, guide our debate, and guide our 
decision.”63   
 Reason and passion also sometimes constrain judicial action. A civil judgment may be 
overturned or reversed on appeal, for example, when counsel’s appeal to juror bias produces a 
verdict that “reflects passion rather than reason.”64 In cases charging capital crimes or other 
serious offenses, courts and commentators regularly summon jurors to return verdicts, judges to 
                                                 
60 Frederick Douglass, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 32 (John Stauffer ed., 2003).  
61 See, e.g., When Passion, Not Reason, Rules, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 6, 2004, at B8 
(editorial) (California’s “three strikes” sentencing law); Do More For Bilingual Ed? Yes Judge’s Ruling of State’s 
Failure is No Surprise, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 2000, at 6B (bilingual education); William E. Gibson, Bill Lowers 
Cuban Refugee Status, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 15, 1995, at 3A (immigration bill concerning 
Cuban refugees; quoting Sen. Paul Simon: “Our policy toward Cuba is one that has grown out of passion, not 
reason.”).  
62 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S 11552, 11553 (Dec. 5, 2000) (remarks of Sen. Biden on the 
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impose sentences, and citizens to retain attitudes that are grounded in reason, free from passion.65  
 In a 2006 commencement address, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice told Boston 
College graduates about “five important responsibilities of educated people,” including “the 
commitment to reason” and “the responsibility to find and follow your passion.”66  A year later, 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick told local community college graduates that “[t]he 
willingness to face down passion and fear with reason and courage . . . is the hallmark of the 
active citizen.”67 
 Writers have advanced various formulas for managing reason and passion.68 So too have 
contemporary philosophers, political theorists, theologians and biographers, sometimes in the 
titles of books whose discussion strives to balance the two.69  Reviewers and commentators 
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frequently cite the spice that calibrated reason and passion can bring to fiction and non-fiction 
books, movies, plays, opera, music, and sports.70  Speaking to the La Jolla (Calif.) Music Society 
in 2004, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said that law and music each represent “a 
fusion of reason and passion.”71  
IV. REASON AND PASSION IN JUDICIAL OPINION-WRITING  
 Throughout our nation’s history, much has been said about the extent to which judges can 
or should let personal feelings affect the decisionmaking process.72 The debate continues today as 
partisans frequently accuse opponents of nominating and confirming “judicial activists,” judges 
who assertedly decide important cases based on their own personal predilections rather than by 
strictly applying precedents, statutes, and other relevant sources of law.73 
 This debate is not the issue here. This article concerns not how judges reach decisions, but 
how vigorous, forceful writing can justify and explain decisions to the lawyers and parties; to 
future courts, lawyers, and litigants under our system of stare decisis; and sometimes also to lay 
readers in decisions such as Barnette, which touch on matters of wider social concern. The Court 
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decided Barnette by internal debate and vote in conference before Justice Jackson ever put pen to 
paper. 
 Judges write opinions, not as private citizens, but as public officers vested by constitution 
and statute with authority to speak with the force of law. Formulas do not decide or explain cases, 
but in constitutional and non-constitutional decisionmaking alike, “reason” loosely means 
application of relevant legal doctrine to the facts, and “passion” loosely means vigorous, forceful 
writing that justifies and explains the decision’s grounding in fact and law.  
 On a collegial appellate court, the appropriate balance of reason and passion depends in 
significant measure on whether the judge is writing a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. 
The majority opinion determines the parties’ rights and obligations while creating precedents and 
rationales for future cases. Reason may rein in passion because the writer knows that our system 
of precedent means that every paragraph, sentence, and clause – including every passage tinged 
with emotion – remains grist for later citation and potential application. A later court may find a 
particular passage to constitute holding, or else to constitute dictum warranting distinction or 
some measure of persuasive effect, but the passage’s effect as a source of law derives from the 
court’s constitutional and statutory authority to decide cases.  
 Writers of concurring and dissenting opinions may feel a diminished sense of constraint 
because their writings, by themselves, make no immediate law. If the writer so chooses, a 
concurrence, and particularly a dissent, can rely more on passion, freer from the need to maintain 
a coalition or to exercise circumspection in decisionmaking. Dean Roscoe Pound said that on a 
court of last resort, a dissenting opinion “should express [the judge’s] reason, not his feelings.”74 
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At one time or another, however, most of the recent Justices have seen the media call their 
dissents “passionate.”75  
 “A dissent in a court of last resort,” wrote Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, is “an 
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision 
may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been 
betrayed.”76 The dissenter’s appeal stands a better chance, however, with a healthy dose of reason 
than with unrestrained passion.  From one era to the next, Justices such as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and John Marshall Harlan have held the title of a “Great Dissenter,” but their influential dissents 
persuaded future Courts with reasoned legal blueprints delivered forcefully, and not with 
unadorned fist-pounding or shrill emotion.      
 Barnette demonstrates that focused passion can invigorate a majority opinion’s reasoned 
analysis. From the outset, every participant in the flag-salute drama sensed the high stakes at 
issue. Few claims of right command greater respect than sincere invocations of religious liberty, 
and few justifications for government action command greater force than invocations of national 
security in wartime. As the Court fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to apply the First 
Amendment during the struggle against totalitarian regimes, Justice Jackson sought to instruct 
that Americans would tolerate personal conscience, even when reverence for the flag was at stake.   
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 The reasoned instruction would have fallen flat if Barnette’s majority had delivered what 
then-Professor Felix Frankfurter had disparaged in 1931 as “the inevitable lawyer's writing – the 
dull qualifications and circumlocutions that sink any literary barque or even freighter, the lifeless 
tags and rags that preclude grace and stifle spontaneity.”77 Turgid legalese would have decided 
the case for the parties, but would likely also have destined the decision for swift deposit in the 
U.S. Reports, barely remembered among later decisions that would reaffirm similar constitutional 
propositions. Instead, Justice Jackson assured Barnette’s immortality by combining reason with 
passion to dismantle the four specific grounds that Justice Frankfurter had advanced in Gobitis. 
   
Gobitis Ground # 1: Granting some public school children exemptions from mandatory flag 
salute and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance would make the government appear “too weak to 
maintain its own existence.”78  
 Justice Jackson scoffed at the notion that “the strength of government to maintain itself 
would be impressively vindicated by our confirming power of the state to expel a handful of 
children from school.”79 “Government of limited power need not be anemic government,” he 
continued, with passion accompanying the statement of reason. “Assurance that rights are secure 
tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to live under 
it makes for its better support. . . . To enforce [the Bill of Rights] today is not to choose weak 
government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual 
freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a 
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disappointing and disastrous end.”80 
 
Gobitis Ground # 2:  By creating constitutionally-based exemptions to mandatory in-school flag 
salutes, federal judges would become “the school board for the country.”81  
 The Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Jackson countered, “protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted.”82 Once again passion 
took center stage. School boards “have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are 
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms 
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”83 
Gobitis Ground # 3: Because exemptions from mandatory in-school flag salutes raise disciplinary 
issues beyond the competence of federal judges, exemptions should be won at the ballot box and 
not in the courts.84  
 “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights,” Justice Jackson responded with a firm passionate 
voice, “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; 
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they depend on the outcome of no elections.”85 
 “[W]e act in these matters,” Justice Jackson continued, “not by authority of our 
competence but by the force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our 
competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history 
authenticates of the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”86   
 
Gobitis Ground # 4: The Constitution permits mandatory in-school flag salutes because “[t]he 
ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.”87  
 “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent,” Justice Jackson wrote, “soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the 
unanimity of the graveyard.”88 
 “[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution,” he explained, “with no fear that freedom 
to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social 
organization.”89  
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and 
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the 
appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the 
rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional 
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as 
those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to 
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things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”90 
 Justice Jackson closed his opinion with a passionate endorsement of individual freedom 
that has been called “the most illuminating definition of Americanism in the history of the 
Court”:91  
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.92 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. “The Freedom to Disagree” 
 Because Justice Jackson was such a graceful writer, Justice Frankfurter reminisced years 
later, “his style sometimes stole attention from the substance.”93 Justice Jackson’s dextrous 
admixture of reason and passion, however, should not overshadow the durability of Barnette’s 
First Amendment holding. The Court had decided Gobitis under the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses. By ruling instead under the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, Barnette conferred rights 
on all claimants who establish entitlement, and not only on ones moved by religious belief.94 
After more than sixty years, Barnette remains the Court’s leading statement of the First 
Amendment right to “refrain from speaking.”95  
 The distinction between a narrower religious freedom and a broader expressive freedom 
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retains contemporary significance. In 2009, for example, ten-year-old Will Phillips, a fifth grader 
at the West Fork Middle School in Washington County, Arkansas refused to stand and join his 
classmates in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. The reason, he said, was that “I really don’t feel 
that there’s currently liberty and justice for all” because gays and lesbians could not exercise such 
rights as the right to marry and the right to adopt children.96 Like the Gobitas and Barnett children 
who were about Will’s age when they and their families took their stand decades earlier, Will 
endured taunting and harsh words from some classmates but support from others.97  
 Will Phillips and his supportive parents made no claim of religious freedom, but school 
authorities recognized that Barnette squarely conferred the First Amendment right to free 
expression that the young man sought to exercise. Asked what it means to be an American, Will 
responded, “Freedom of speech. The freedom to disagree. That’s what I think pretty much being 
an American represents.”98 
  B. “[A]n Excellent Writer, Period”  
 “Solicitor General for life,” was the title that Justice Louis D. Brandeis would have 
conferred on Robert H. Jackson, who argued more than four dozen appeals in the Supreme Court 
as Assistant Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Attorney General before his appointment to 
the Court in 1941.99 But Justice Jackson leaves a record as much more than a lawyer who, as 
Justice Frankfurter put it, approached the bar “specially endowed as an advocate.”100 
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  Justice Antonin Scalia calls Justice Jackson his “hero,” someone who “wrote beautiful 
opinions and was on the right side of things, too.”101 Professor Charles Alan Wright went a 
significant step further, calling Justice Jackson “the best writer ever to sit on the Court.”102  
 Justice Jackson achieved his lofty status as the Court‘s paramount writer without relying 
heavily on law clerks or other ghost writers to compose his work or turn a phrase for him. At 
President Harry S Truman’s request, he took a leave of absence from the Court in 1945 to serve as 
chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. A young assistant, assigned 
to help prepare Jackson’s closing argument to the international tribunal a year later, felt hurt when 
the Justice did not use any of his draft. Only later did the assistant learn that “Jackson did not like 
‘ghosts.’ He felt that the words of a speaker or writer should be his own words and not those of 
another.”103 
 In 1957, former Jackson law clerk William H. Rehnquist attested that “[e]ven a casual 
acquaintance with [Justice Jackson’s] opinions during the 13 years he served on the Court 
indicates that he neither needed nor used ghost writers.”104 “The great majority of opinions which 
he wrote,” Rehnquist continued, “were drafted originally by him and submitted to his clerks for 
their criticism and suggestions. Frequently such a draft would be batted back and forth between 
the Justice and the particular clerk working on it several times. The contributions of the clerk by 
way of research, organization and, to a lesser extent, method of approach, was often substantial. 
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But the end product was unquestionably the Justice’s own, both in form and in substance.”105 
 Six weeks before the Barnette decision, Justice Jackson had stressed the Court’s  
responsibility “to do our utmost to make clear and understandable the reasons for deciding cases 
as we do.”106 Barnette delivered on the promise with a clear exposition of reason and passion 
because Justice Jackson held a distinct personal advantage. “Good legal writing,” says Professor 
Richard C. Wydick, “does not sound as though it had been written by a lawyer.”107 Justice 
Jackson left a legacy of eloquence because, as in Barnette, he indeed did not “write like a 
lawyer.” Professor Fred Rodell even speculated that Justice Jackson “wrote so unlegally well – 
with the force of plain and pointed talk replacing lawyers’ jargon – because he never went 
through law school nor won a law degree; indeed, . . . he never even went through college, and 
one ungraduating year of law study . . . was his only formal education after high school.”108  
Justice Jackson was a largely self-taught writer, and he was both a good teacher and an 
avid learner. In 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist was right that his mentor “was not simply an 
excellent legal writer, he was an excellent writer, period.”109   
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